HOW DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL JUDGES CONTROL THE MAYHEM AND JIM CROW DOCTRINES KEEPING CHICAGO ILLINOIS SEGREGATED AND CORRUPT.

TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL MINDED POLITICIANS AND OTHERS ARE RUNNING A GAMUT IN CHICAGO BECAUSE THEY ARE AWARE DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL JUDGES WHO HATES PEOPLE OF COLOR AND ANY CAUCASIAN SPEAKING AGAINST RACISM, INJUSTICE OR ANY AREA OF DISCRIMINATION THEIR CLAIMS WILL BE DENIED IN FEDERAL COURT.

THIS DOCUMENT DEMONSTRATES THE HATRED FEDERAL JUDGES HAVE AGAINST PRO SE INDIVIDUALS EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IN THE COURTS AS MARKED MEN WHERE JUDGES USES THE LAWS AS WEAPONS UNLAWFULLY KEEPING GENOCIDE AND APARTHEID IN EFFECT MAKING SURE DEMOCRATS INVOLVED NOT BE ADMONISHED BY THE LAWS.

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ALL FEDERAL LAWS ON ALL ACCOUNTS GUARANTEE AND DEMONSTRATE LEE'S VICTORY IN THE COURT BUT JUDGES FILLED WITH HATE ARE WEARING THEIR ROBES SIMPLY TO DENY AND OPPRESS ANY AND ALL PERSONS SPEAKING UP AND FIGHTING AGAINST RACIAL INJUSTICE IN THE COURTS.

READ! READ! READ! HOW THESE JUDGES FALSIFY COURT ORDERS FABRICATE THE LAWS PROTECTING TERRORISTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL MACHINE! 

                                                              IN THE

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                         FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

                                           CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

_________________________________________________________________

                                                          

_________________________________________________________________

 Lee Oties Love, Jr.                                    )   Appeal from the United States District

      Plaintiff-Appellant                                 )        Court for the Northern District

         No. 17-3489                                       )           Of Illinois, Eastern Division

               vs.                                                 )

                                                                     )

Supreme Court of Ill., et al                         )       JUDGE Sharon Johnson Coleman

       Defendant-Appellee                             )

                                                                     )              17 CV-05482

                                                                     )

_________________________________________________________________

                                                           

             MOTION TO VACATE REMAND JUDGMENT DUE TO FEDERAL JUDGES ACTING AS “PRIVATE CITIZENS” “TRESPASSING UPON THE LAWS” DENYING JURISDICTION w/AFFIDAVIT MAKING SAID JUDGMENT A “NULLITY”

                                                                       

_________________________________________________________________

                                                             

    Now comes Plaintiff-Appellant, Lee Oties Love, Jr., Pro Se in this cause respectfully represents to this court the reasons and files herewith his Affidavit in support of Motion to Vacate Remand Judgment et al;

                                                                 Respectfully Submitted,

                                                                             By:   _________________         
                                                                                             Lee Oties Love, Jr.

                                                                                               8435 S. Peoria

                                                                              Chicago, IL. 60620

                                                           773 783-5691

                                                                            

                                                              IN THE

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                         FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

                                           CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

                                                         AFFIDAVIT

                                                                                                                                                               

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE REMAND JUDGMENT DUE TO FEDERAL JUDGES ACTING AS “PRIVATE CITIZENS” “TRESPASSING UPON THE LAWS” DENYING JURISDICTION w/AFFIDAVIT MAKING SAID JUDGMENT A “NULLITY”

I am Lee Oties Love, Jr., Pro Se, in this cause, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states, as follows;

1.      That on Feb. 20, 2018, said Court of Appeals suspended the Rule to Show Cause against the Appellant and ordered that Brief be submitted March 23, 2018.

2.      That on March 23, 2018, Appellant filed his Brief and properly Noticed all parties with a copy of the Briefs.

3.      CIRCUIT RULE 31. Filing of Briefs and Failure to Timely File Briefs

(d) Failure of Appellee to File Brief. When an appellee's brief is not filed on time, the clerk shall enter an order requiring the appellee to show cause within 14 days why the case should not be treated as ready for oral argument or submission and the appellee denied oral argument. The court will then take appropriate action.

4.      That it is now 83 days surpassing in of the Federal Rules for any clerk or Appellee to respond.

5.      That because Cook County is deemed a Criminal Enterprise where judges only wear their robes so as to “Trespass upon the Laws” and Bully indigent or helpless clients “Private Citizen” Pamela Loza has issued a Bogus Warrant against the Appellant for exercising his legal rights in the courts by criminalizing him and preventing him from gainful employment, for example V.A. Vegetable Juice, in Bedford Park, Il. Mars M&M Candy, Schiller Park, Il., Chicago Heights Steel, Chicago, Heights Il., Ford Motor Co. East Chg. Torrance Plant, City of Chg., Dept. of Labor, City of Chg. Iron Workers all of these jobs were applied to in the last 4 months backgrounds never came back and cleared due to the unlawful warrant issued by the racist Judge Pamela Loza.

6. A federal court always has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A federal court has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a particular case. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing United States v. Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)). • In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947) (“‘[A] court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’”).

7. See also Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)) (“‘[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’”). In re Bunyan, 354 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)) (“A federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”). 13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3536, p. 1 (“‘Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court to determine whether it has authority over the parties to and the subject matter of a suit.”) [here in after 13D Wright & Miller]. 4 B. Unique Aspects of Jurisdiction in Practice The issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction “concerns the fundamental constitutional question of the allocation of judicial power between the federal and state governments.”

8. Wright & Miller § 3522, p. 125. Because of these weighty concerns, jurisdiction is a unique issue in the federal courts. Below, this outline notes five ways that adjudication of jurisdiction is different than adjudication of substantive issues. 1. A federal court must generally determine whether it has jurisdiction at the outset of litigation and must always make this determination before deciding the merits of a particular case. A court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in the suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) . . . .” Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (declining to address jurisdiction and holding that district court had authority to dismiss action on forum non conveniens grounds before considering the merits) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998) (rejecting doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction” that would allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating jurisdiction)). • Toeller v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 461 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Before considering the merits of [the] appeal, we must resolve a preliminary question of appellate jurisdiction.”). Jurisdiction Upheld • Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (quoting Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir.2008)) (“‘Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.’”). Jurisdiction Lacking Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (“As a threshold matter, we must decide whether we have jurisdiction . . . .”). • 13 Wright & Miller § 3522, p. 147. See also a. Exception: In some circumstances (lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens) a court can dismiss a case on non-merits grounds before deciding whether jurisdiction exists.

9.    Although courts must generally decide a jurisdictional issue before deciding the merits of a case, “a federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to 5 a case on the merits.’” Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). So, while a court cannot consider the merits of a case before deciding a jurisdictional issue, a court can decide a case on non-merits grounds before deciding whether jurisdiction exists. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized two “threshold grounds” on which a court can resolve a case without addressing subject matter jurisdiction: (1) personal jurisdiction and (2) forum non conveniens. Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (“Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry.”); Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (applying exception to forum non conveniens).

10.    The Ninth Circuit has held that the personal-jurisdiction exception to the jurisdiction-first rule is limited to cases where deciding the personal jurisdiction issue would result in the end of the case. Special Invs., Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2004). In Special Investments, the court held that it was improper for the district court to dismiss an action against a defendant when other defendants remained without first deciding whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The D.C. Circuit has provided a test to determine when a court can decide an issue before adjudicating jurisdiction: a court can decide an issue before jurisdiction if the issue does not involve “an exercise of a court’s law-declaring power . . . .” See Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

      11.   A court exercises its law-declaring power when a ruling has an effect on “primary conduct.” See id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (classifying rules affecting “primary decisions respecting human conduct” as substantive for purposes of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

     12.  That said judge violated the oath of her duties recognizing she had jurisdiction as she “Trespassed upon the Laws” by corroborating her role in an “Organized Conspiracy” engaging in “Treason” Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer.  The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

    13.  Plaintiff stated, Page 3, Par 14-18 from the transcript, “And the reason why I’m here is that me, the defendant is petitioning rule to show cause remanding Circuit Court judge Pamela Elizabeth Loza and attorneys are trespassing upon the law, corroboration in an organized chain conspiracy of treason, fraud of all sorts..” Line 19 Judge Coleman stated, “I need to stop you right there”, Line 23-24, She stated, “Okay, I have read, read some of it. I read you even though it looked like a filing” Page 4, Par 11-12, Judge Coleman stated, “when you dealt with them, were they – they were judges and it was in court, is that correct?” Plaintiff’s reply Line 13, “Yes Ma’am” Lines 14-16, Judge Coleman stated, “All right. Well, they have immunity. You cannot sue them for anything that happened in the case. You can’t sue them personally” Line 18-19 she further stated, “So they cannot---I have dismiss to them out. I have no jurisdiction over them. Do you understand?”   

Judge Coleman stated, Page 6, Par 2 “You understand I answer to the U.S. Supreme Court.”

The District court closed her eyes to the “VOID ORDERS” entered against the Plaintiff and entered an order described as a nullity.

    14.  In addition, when judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason.

A-     Pursuant to {28 USCA 144, 455 (B) (1)} Sufficient for Removal, conduct which does not constitute a criminal offense may be sufficiently violative of the Judicial Canons to warrant removal for cause. Napolitano v Ward, 457 F 2d 279 (7^th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1037, 93 S. Ct. 512, 34 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1972), that said District Court judge methodically violated her oath by stating said Plaintiff dismissed his own case when in fact Page 4, Lines 18, 19, Judge Coleman stated, “I have dismiss to them out. I have no jurisdiction over them. Do you understand?” 

2. That Page 6, Lines 12-17, Judge stated, “You have crossed over into the Federal court, and I deal with national issues. I don’t deal with domestic relations and child support unless it’s a usually international case or maybe even people in maybe different states, but usually not someone coming to me directly from the Circuit Court of Cook County”.

3. That Page 7, Lines 3-6, Plaintiff stated, “Which I don’t understand according to law that they denied my written mandamus. But the thing about that is it was, it was not signed by a judge”.

4. That Page 7, Lines 7-8, 10-14 Judge stated, “I’m not the Illinois Supreme Court.” “And I don’t tell them how ----and usually if they don’t sign something, and I don’t know if they had a signature on that, sometimes they issue orders that are not opinions that they can sign. I don’t know. I’ve never been on the Illinois Supreme Court, and I don’t work for them”.

5. That from the Complaint captioned Complaint of Civil Rights Violations, Trespassing of the Laws, Treason et al. said June 6, 2017, Ex’s 1-3 orders from the Sup. Ct. attached as exhibits corroborating said assertions not signed by any judge but cc’d to all parties.

 Pursuant to Sup Ct. Rule 272 “if at the time of announcing final judgment  the judge requires the submission of a form of written judgment to be signed by the judge et al” the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed— Judges are bound by this rule before their court orders are valid;

6. In furtherance to the aforementioned, Plaintiff had to appear before a probationary officer August 30, 2017 where his prior caseworker Claudia Swan had taken a medical leave and Robert Eizenga was the new case worker and discovered Judge Thomas Panici had charged Plaintiff with a DUI case # 15 C 660004301 12-18-14 and 12-17-15 District 6 room 103, Plaintiff not only never appeared before this judge but he does not drink alcohol;

7. That on the same related case number SS16600043-00 there was a fine charge of $1200.00 Seq# 001 24 months a clerk by the name of Thomas entered this information;

8. That as a result to the terrorist acts perpetrated at the Plaintiff by Democrats organized by powerful men and women racist in nature and spirit, hereto attached Gr Ex B Motion for Supervisory Order by Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, for the Office of the State Appellate Defender;

9. Said Deputy Defender stated, Par 6, Page 3 “He should not be denied his right to an appeal due to a series of bureaucratic errors that were not his fault”

10. Citing Canon 2A the court noted, “[a] court’s indifference to clearly stated rules breeds disrespect for and discontent with our justice system. Government cannot demand respect of the laws by its citizens when its tribunals ignore those very same laws”)

11. That said District Court judge had her Deputy Clerk to notify the Plaintiff twice at his home making sure he appeared in court at 8:30am but never notified any of the Defendants to appear before her;

12.  The District Court demonstrating an act of Improprieties in an attempt to aid and assist said Defendant’s  named in Suit, In Re Judge No. 93-154, 440 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 1994), And Deception by falsifying reasons for preventing a legally sufficient Complaint and Motion from being served on Appellee’s, In re Ferrara, 582 N.W. 2d 817 (Mich. 1998),In re Renfer, 493 S.E. 2d 434 (N.C. 1997), In re Kroger, 702 A. 2d 64 (Vt. 1997), Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 33 Cal. 3d 359, 657 P. 2d 372, 377, 188 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1983).

13. Section 1983 of U.S.C.S. contemplates the depravation of Civil Rights through the Unconstitutional Application of a Law by conspiracy or otherwise. Mansell v. Saunders (CA 5 F 1A) 372 F 573, especially if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect, where an action is for a conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1985 (3), or for the depravation of such rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect and plaintiff was thereby deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and Laws, the gist of the action may be treated as one for the depravation of rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, Lewis v. Brautigam (CA 5 F 1a) 227 F 2d 124, 55 Alr 2d 505, John W. Strong, 185, 777-78 (4 th ed. 1992)

14. That the Judge erred considerably when it received notice and knowledge of other Judges complicit in a Criminal Conspiracy failed to follow Canon Ethics Leslie W. Abramson, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 751 (1997). The Judges Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges and Lawyers and its effect on Judicial Independence.

15. That because many white nationalist have infiltrated the Democratic party and has methodically overturned the legal tribunal recruiting the necessary persons who will keep their mouths shut and continue the terrorist mayhem on innocent citizens fighting injustice in the courts;

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court   of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,     1531 (7th Cir. 1985).

The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge "Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago". Bracey v. Gramley, case No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).

Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 2, 3 & 4, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of the judges who have been convicted, the other judges are as guilty as the convicted judges.

The criminal activities that the Federal Courts found in the Circuit Court of Cook County still exist, and are today under the care, custody and control of Judge Timothy C. Evans (Chief Judge). The Circuit Court of Cook County remains a criminal enterprise.             

Defendants/Appellees have not raised any affirmative defenses and have been properly Noticed pursuant to Rule 56.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, viewed in a light most favorable to the movant or non-movant fail to establish a genuine issue of material fact, thereby    

Entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.

The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but simply to                 

Determine whether one exists.

When the party moving for summary judgment supplies evidentiary facts which,

 If not contradicted, would entitle him to judgment, the opposing party cannot

 Rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise issues of material fact. A counter

 Affidavit is necessary to refute evidentiary facts properly asserted by affidavit

 Supporting the motion or else the facts are deemed admitted.

Here, Plaintiff has supplied affidavits, Certified Court transcripts and other evidentiary material that establishes all of the elements necessary to entitle it to recovery under the parties’ agreements, including the amount of damages. Defendants have failed to submit any evidence in opposition to the Motion or Order to raise any genuine issues of material fact. Thus summary judgment was proper.

Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below).

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].

By law, a judge is a state officer as in this case Federal officers.

The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person). 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that prisoners who are not represented by counsel in federal civil rights litigation are entitled to receive notice of the consequences of failing to respond with affidavit to motions for summary judgment that are supported by affidavit. This opinion established a new rule in the circuit.

In this case, art Indiana state prisoner filed a civil rights action against several prison officials. The defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss, "or in the alternative for summary judgment." The defendants' motion was supported by affidavits that contradicted the prisoner's allegations. When the prisoner failed to respond, the district court dismissed the complaint.

In a thoughtful opinion, Judge Posner noted that "the purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to head off a full-scale trial by conducting a trial in miniature, on affidavits, so that not submitting counter affidavits is the equivalent of not presenting any evidence at trial." In the process, he construed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 to require a "reasonable opportunity" to rebut motions for summary judgment, and that a "reasonable opportunity presupposes notice."

In a case where prisoner plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court issued a rule of decision that requires any motions for summary judgment to include the text of Rule 56(c) and a "statement in ordinary English" alerting the prisoner to the consequences of such a motion. If counsel fails to provide the notice, the burden shifts to the trial court. The judgment in this case was vacated and remanded. See: Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982).

The lack of explicit notice would not be troubling if it were obvious to a layman that when his opponent files a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits he must file his own affidavits contradicting his opponent's if he wants to preserve factual issues for trial. But this aspect of federal civil practice is contrary to lay intuition, which is that the first step in a civil litigation is the filing of a complaint, the second the filing of an answer, and the third the trial of the case. The defendants here filed no answer. Their first pleading was the motion. It would not be realistic to impute to a prison inmate (unless, like the "former law professor" of whom this court spoke in Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), the prisoner has legal training) an instinctual awareness that the purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to head off a full-scale trial by conducting a trial in miniature, on affidavits, so that not submitting counter affidavits is the equivalent of not presenting any evidence at trial. We credit the plaintiff with knowing that if his case was tried and he failed to present evidence he would lose. This much he should know without having read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But we do not think he can be charged with the further knowledge that a failure to offer affidavits when his opponent files something called "Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment" is an equivalent default.

Since few prisoners have a legal background, we think it appropriate to lay down a general rule that a prisoner who is a plaintiff in a civil case and is not represented by counsel is entitled to receive notice of the consequences of failing to respond with affidavits to a motion for summary judgment. Such a rule, already adopted in two other circuits, see Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), is a natural evolution of our own frequently expressed concern with this problem. See, e.g., Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1981). It goes without saying that the rule applies with equal force when affidavits are submitted in support of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). Indeed, applied to such a motion our new rule has a firmer basis in the text of the Federal Rules than it has as applied to Rule 56 motions proper, since as noted earlier Rule 12(b) explicitly requires a "reasonable opportunity" for the opponent to counter the movant's affidavits. However, for the reasons stated earlier we are satisfied that the same requirement is implicit in Rule 56, and hence that the rule we announce today is a proper interpretation of Rule 56 in the special circumstances presented by prisoner civil rights litigation. We leave for another day the possible extension of our new rule to other classes of pro se civil litigants, including applicants for habeas corpus.

We are naturally reluctant to impose additional duties on our overburdened district courts. But we trust that counsel for the defendants in prisoner civil rights cases in this circuit will lift this new burden from the judges' shoulders, by henceforth including in any motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff is not assisted by counsel a short and plain statement that any factual assertion in the movant's affidavits will be accepted by the district judge as being true unless the plaintiff submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion. The text of Rule 56(e) should be part of the notice, but in addition to rather than instead of the statement in ordinary English that we are requiring.

If counsel for defendants fail to provide the required information it will be the district judge's responsibility to do so, but we hope this will rarely be necessary. Most defendants in prisoners' rights cases in this circuit are represented by one of the three state attorneys general in the circuit, who we are sure will cooperate in implementing the new rule with minimum inconvenience to our harassed district judges.

The judgment of the district court entered on the defendants' motion for summary judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and Remanded.

Pursuant to other Federal judges engaging in Treason “Trespassing upon the Laws” No. 11-3481 JOE LOUIS LAWRENCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, et a!., Defendants-Appellees.

Judges acting as “Private Citizens” Kenneth F. Ripple, Ann Claire Williams and Diane S. Sykes lodged a similar slanderous defamation approach to Joe Louis Lawrence, Appellant in that case, stated “In 1987 the State of Illinois ordered Joe Lawrence to pay child support. He did not comply, and consequently the state revoked his driver's license. He appealed the revocation to the Secretary of State, but his appeal was denied. Lawrence also unsuccessfully sued his former employers, International Brands Corporation and the Chicago Transit Authority, in state and federal court for embezzlement and theft.

That Gr Ex 4, validate the verity of many “Democratic Private Citizens” perpetrating as judges colluded in unison as they committed “Treason” and “Trespassed upon the Laws” and violated Appellants’ Civil Rights where he was locked up 5 times for allegedly owing child support on a court order that had no judges or attorneys signatures case #88 D 079012 and was unlawfully removed from his places of employment as money was extorted from his wages.

That Ex 5, Demonstrate the racial hatred and Demonic episodes “Private Citizens” engaged in making sure an innocent Appellant life was destroyed when a Certified Court Order was signed by a judge (September 17, 1987) validating the case was Dismissed with 2 sets of Paternity tests that was altered to protect the Policeman responsible for impregnating his minor biological daughter   

The aforementioned judges falsified reasons so as to protect all Democrats involved as said judges Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, Daniel A. Manion and Ilana Diamond Rovner are doing in this matter.

That Appellant file a Motion for Disqualification of Judge –Personal Bias or Prejudice {28 USCA 144, 455 {B} {1} Vacate Order of May 3, 2018 & May 9 due to Federal Clerk Committing Fraud Entering Court Order in Computer Unlawfully, (Filed May 11, 2018) DL is on the file stamp.  Case #16 CV 7434

A-   A Clerk in the Seventh Circuit mailed the Motion back to the Appellant trying cover up the crimes of mail fraud, Judicial “Treason” and other felonies being committed.

B-   A Pro Se clerk returned the said Motion claiming Appellant had no case but it was not signed.

C-   That said Democrats have exhausted every method of deception humanly impossible making sure said Pro Se Appellant not receive Equal Protection of the laws by misappropriating the laws not germane to the issues put before this court.

"The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not

Participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant's brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the brief and record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(c).

“Lawrence filed this suit pro se in federal court alleging that the child support order, the driver' s-license revocation, and the dismissal of his civil suit, were all caused by a broad conspiracy of Illinois state officials, and that their actions had violated his civil rights.” Not one Democratic official or attorney ever DENIED or OBJECTED to any of the Affidavits, Motions put before the courts because they were expecting the Seventh Circuit of Democratic judges to protect and “Trespass upon the Laws” demonstrating their Terrorist Control over all legal tribunals denying and every document Appellant filed and presented blowing the whistle on Democratic Terrorism controlling the courts.   

                                                                                          Respectfully, Submitted,

                                                                                   _______________________  

                                                                                            Lee Oties Love, Jr.

                                                                                              8435 S. Peoria

                                                                              Chicago, IL. 60620

                                                           773 783-5691

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

WHEREFORE the aforementioned reasons Plaintiff respectfully Prays for the Relief

1.    For an Order Vacating Remand Judgment Instanter.

2.    For an Order Granting Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 56.

3. For an Order Transferring this case outside of the jurisdiction of the (Seventh Circuit) Federal Judges engaging in “Treason” “Trespassing upon the Laws” pursuant to Rule 26  it implements the Breyer Committee’s recommended use of transfers. Breyer Committee Report, 239 F.R.D. at 214-15.

Rule 26 authorizes the transfer of a complaint proceeding to another judicial council selected by the Chief Justice. Such transfers may be appropriate, for example, in the case of a serious complaint where there are multiple disqualifications among the original council, where the issues are highly visible and a local disposition may weaken public confidence in the process, where internal tensions arising in the council as a result of the complaint render disposition by a less involved council appropriate, or where a complaint calls into question policies or governance of the home court of appeals et al.        

                That the present judges in the Seventh Circuit read evidence of Cook County judges violating the RICO ACT, the 7^th Cir. Held that the Cook County Courts were a Criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F. 2d 1518, 1531 where precedent was enacted by Judges Frank H. Easterbrook, Richard D. Cudahy and former Chief judge Luther Merritt Swygert;

                That every judge in the Seventh Circuit closed their eyes to every complaint said Petitioner put before them on appeal in affidavits validating the verity of judges committing Treason Trespassing upon the laws of the United States Constitution engaging in “WAR” against the United States Constitution making every order rendered against the Petitioner. If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he or she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason;

                                                              IN THE

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                         FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

                                           CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

_________________________________________________________________

                                                         

_________________________________________________________________

 Lee Oties Love, Jr.                                    )   Appeal from the United States District

      Plaintiff-Appellant                                 )        Court for the Northern District

         No. 17-3489                                       )           Of Illinois, Eastern Division

               Vs.                                                )

                                                                     )

Supreme Court of Ill., et al                           )       JUDGE Sharon Johnson Coleman

       Defendant-Appellees                           )

                                                                     )              17 CV-05482

                                                                     )

_________________________________________________________________

                                                    NOTICE OF      

 MOTION TO VACATE REMAND JUDGMENT DUE TO FEDERAL JUDGES ACTING AS “PRIVATE CITIZENS” “TRESPASSING UPON THE LAWS” DENYING JURISDICTION w/AFFIDAVIT MAKING SAID JUDGMENT A “NULLITY”                                                                    _________________________________________________________________

                                                                                                                                               

Please be advised that on, May 30, 2018 Plaintiff has filed before this Court of Appeals, Motion to Vacate Remand Judgment et al;

                       U.S. Attorney

                       John R. Lausch, Jr.

                      219 South Dearborn Suite 500

                      Chicago, Ill 60605

        Cook County State’s Attorney            Chief Judge Timothy C. Evans

         Kim Foxx                                              50 West Washington, Suite 2600

         50 West Washington, Suite 500                Chicago, Ill. 60601

         Chicago, Ill. 60601                          

                                                                       

        Supreme Court of Illinois, 200 East Capital Ave. Springfield IL. 62701-1721;

   

      Pamela Elizabeth Loza 50 West Washington, Chicago, IL 60601,

Room 3009;

      James P. Murphy 555 West Harrison, Chicago, IL. 60607, Room 402;

       Luciano Panici 16501 South Kedzie Parkway, Markham IL. 60428, Room 105;

       Joshua P. Haid Sears/Willis Tower 233 South Wacker, Chicago IL. 60606 84^th floor;   

                                           

               PLEASE BE ADVISED that on May 21, 2018, A Motion for Summary Judgment et al. has been filed with the United States Court of Appeals and said copies being served on said applicable parties via hand delivery or regular mail;

                                                                                          Respectfully, Submitted,

                                                                                   _______________________  

                                                                                            Lee Oties Love, Jr.

                                                                                              8435 S. Peoria

                                                                              Chicago, IL. 60620

                                                           773 783-5691