SEE HOW JUDGES IN ILLINOIS AND CHICAGO DO NOT HONOR THE 14TH AMENDMENT OR ANY PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHEN IT INVOLVES AMERICAN CITIZENS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES.
NO PARTY CAN LOVE YOU MORE THAN YOU LOVE YOURSELF, THIS IS WHY SO MANY PEOPLE HAVE NO RESPECT FOR BLACK OR BROWN AUTHORITY BECAUSE THEY ARE EASILY BOUGHT AND WHORED OUT FOR LITTLE OF NOTHING.
BUT FOR SOME DAM REASON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ARE PRIORITIZED AND CRIMINALS MORE THAN TAXPAYERS AND CITIZENS.
TAKE A LOOK AT THE LAWS HERE IN THIS DOCUMENT VERY FEW IF ANY DEMOCRATIC JUDGES ARE AWARE OF THIS LAW WHICH WAS CREATED BY OL SKOOL REPUBLICANS AND QUALIFIED DEMOCRATS WHEN THURGOOD MARSHALL WAS ON THE US SUPREME COURT.
MY MOM READ THIS DOCUMENT AND SAID THIS IS KNOWLEDGE THAT NOT MANY OF THE JUDGES ARE AWARE OF AND WANT TO KNOW HOW DO, I KNOW THIS AND SO MANY OF THEM ARE NOT AWARE OF THESE LAWS.
I CONSIDER MYSELF A HUMBLE SERVANT WHO HAVE BEEN MANY TIMES DENIED BUT NEVER TRIED IN ANY COURT OF LAW, BUT EVERY JUDGE WHO HAVE DENIED ME CALLED ME FRIVOLOUS, INCOHERENT, FANCIFUL, DENIED ME THE RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL AS A PAUPER BEING INDIGENT, IN MANY CASES HAD THE CLERKS TO DELETE THE ENTIRE DOCUMENTS FROM THE DATABASE, SO AS TO MAKE IT LOOK AS IF, I MADE UP THE SHIT, THAT WAS BEING ASSERTED IN THE PLEADINGS.
BUT WHAT NONE OF THE JUDGES KNEW OR UNDERSTOOD ABOUT THE LAW IS THAT WHEN MORE THAN ONE JUDGE ENGAGES IN FELONIES:
See that is why,
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (was
enacted) - Section 1 (42 U.S.C.) 1983.
“Of all the Civil Rights legislation enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War, none has had a greater contemporary impact than the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. The Act grew out of a special one-paragraph message sent to the 42d Congress on March 23, 1871, by President Ulysses S. Grant, urgently requesting the enactment of legislation”.
Section 2 (42 U.S.C.)
In the House of Representatives.
“Congressional
Debate of the second section of the Ku Klux Klan Act was more extensive and
enduring than that of Section 1; As originally presented, Sec. 2 made it a
felony for any “two or more persons” to conspire to commit certain enumerated
crimes “in violation of the rights and privileges, or immunities of any person,
to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Under Federal law, which is
applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is
"without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.
They are not voidable but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought,
even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no
justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or
sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot
v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
I THANK AND GIVE HONOR AND PRAISE TO GOD AND ALL OF THE MEMBERS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WHO KNOW EXACTLY WHO THEY ARE TAKING NOTES WAITING FOR THEIR OPPORTUNITY.
TWITTER FRIENDS AND FAMILY LET'S MAKE THIS VIRAL GETTING THESE WONDERFUL FIRST RESPONDERS SISTERS BACK INTO THEIR HOME.
THANK YOU #1LOVEALL
IN THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, } Appeal from the
United
As TRUSTEE for
securitized Trust }
States District Court for
2006-NC3, et al.
} the Northern District of
Plaintiffs
–Appellees
} Illinois, Eastern Division
V
}
No. 24 cv 12195
} No.
}
Monzella Y.
Johnson
}
Defendant-Appellant
} Judge April Perry
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE w/AFFIDAVIT
Now comes Defendant-Appellant, Monzella Y.
Johnson Pro Se in this cause respectfully represents to this court the reasons
and files herewith her Affidavit in support of Motion for Summary Judgment et
al;
1.) That pursuant to the Emergency Motion for
Stay of Execution Prohibiting Altisource, Cook County Sherrif’s or any Person from
Removing said Possessions of 61 Years et al. served via electronically delivery
Jan. 10, 2025, Appellees have admitted to the veracity of all Pleadings
demonstrating Terrorism and violations of the Appellants Civil Rights (Sections
42 USC 1983) having them unlawfully evicted because they litigiously
articulated and particularized said case was Vacated and Affirmed in the
Circuit Court and State Appellate Court (Dec 30, 2011) 14 years ago.
2.) That every judge who became “Private
Citizens” acting outside of their jurisdiction and oath upholding Tyranny,
Terrorism in the Courts have demonstrated a Rebellion against the Federal
Government, United States Constitution and laws of the United States Supreme
Court succinctly articulates how the State and members of the Federal
Government have used Hate, Racism and their Political Affiliation making sure
no Defendant- Appellant receive Equal Protection of the Laws pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
3.) That Page 16 Par 21 another
Appellant (Brief 11-3481) (Brief 07-2287), Motion to Disqualify Judge
Easterbrook was filed and he denied it and an Appointment of Counsel Standish
Willis citing Farmer v. Haas a Homosexual inmate that had nothing to do
with the Freeman Appellant and denied every Motion, he presented to the Court )
Appellant filed a Summary Judgment (Dec 4, 2023) in the Cir Ct of Cook County,
see the Notice of Emergency Defendant’s Original Petition et al. the Chief
Judge, States Attorney and Illinois Attorney General et al all admitted to
egregiously violating his Civil Rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866
as it relates to the Appellant’s present case corroborating the fact no
Democrat has or ever dispensed Equal Protection of the Laws in Chicago,
Illinois and certain Federal Judges of the Republican nature followed suit and
vented their same hate in unlawful rulings to wear down the litigator and
protect the parties initiating racial, criminal or terrorist acts in the
courts.
A-
Defendant
filed Notice of Filing Service on the Registered Agent & all related
Parties et al Dec. 3, 2024.
B-
Plaintiff-Appellees
have never responded to any Summary Judgments, Pleadings or Briefing Schedules
but has admitted to all Pleadings accompanied via Affidavits.
C-
Defendant-Appellant
has asthma medicine at her home and is still homeless due to the continuous racist hateful Civil Rights Violations.
4.) That pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure RULE 8 (1) In General. In
responding to a pleading, a party must:
(A) State in short and plain terms its
defenses to each claim asserted against it; and
(B) Admit or Deny the allegations asserted against it by an
opposing party.
(2) Denials—Responding
to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the
allegation.
(3) General and
Specific Denials. A party that intends in good faith to deny all the
allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a
general denial. A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must
either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except
those specifically admitted.
(4) Denying Part
of an Allegation. A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of
an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest.
(5) Lacking
Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and
the statement, has the effect of a denial.
(6) Effect of
Failing to Deny. An allegation –other than one relating to the amount of
damages –is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is
not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required an allegation is
considered denied or avoided.
5.) For an Order Pursuant to Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 103 S. Ct.
1625, 1629, 75 L Ed 2d 632 (1983) Justice Brennen “The threshold standard for
allowing punitive damages for reckless or callous indifference applies even in
a case, such as here, where the underlying standard of liability for
compensatory damages because is also one of recklessness. There is no merit to
petitioner’s contention that actual malicious intent should be the standard for
punitive damages because the deterrent purposes of such damages would be served
only if the threshold for those damages is higher in every case than the
underlying standard for liability in the first instance. The common-law rule is
otherwise, and there is no reason to depart from the common-law rule in the
context of {1983} of $40 Million Dollars;
6.) Plaintiff-Appellees have not raised any
affirmative defenses.
Summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, viewed
in a light most favorable to the movant or non-movant fail to establish a
genuine issue of material fact, thereby
1. Entitling the moving party
to judgment as a matter of law.
The purpose of summary
judgment is not to try a question of fact, but simply to determine whether
one exists.
When the party moving for
summary judgment supplies evidentiary facts which, if not contradicted, would
entitle her to judgment, the opposing party cannot rely upon his
non-compliance to Federal Rules of Civil Procedures or a court order or a
complaint or answer if submitted alone to raise issues of material fact. A
counter Affidavit is necessary to refute evidentiary facts properly asserted by
affidavit Supporting the motion or else the facts are deemed admitted.
Here, Defendant-Appellant
has supplied affidavits, Court Orders, Certified Court transcripts and other
evidentiary material that establishes all of the elements necessary to entitle
it to recovery, including the amount of damages. Plaintiff-Appellees have
failed to submit any evidence in opposition to any Motions with Affidavits to any
Court to raise any genuine issues of material fact.
7.) That
pursuant to the textbook precedent Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469 (1986) relating to Section 42 USC 1983
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, concluding that:
1. The "official policy" requirement of Monell was intended
to distinguish acts of the municipality from
acts of the municipality's employees, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to actions for which the
municipality is actually responsible. Monell held
that recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly
speaking, "of the municipality," i.e., acts that the municipality has
officially sanctioned or ordered. With this understanding, it is plain that
municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal
policymakers under appropriate circumstances. If the decision to adopt a
particular course of action is directed by those who establish governmental
policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be
taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. Pp. 475 U. S. 477-481.
2. It was error to dismiss petitioner's claim against the
county. Ohio law authorizes the County Sheriff to obtain instructions from the
County Prosecutor. The Sheriff followed the practice of delegating certain
decisions to the Prosecutor where appropriate. In this case, the Deputy
Sheriffs received instructions from the Sheriff's Office to follow the orders
of the County Prosecutor, who made a considered decision based on his
understanding of the law and commanded the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's
clinic. That decision directly caused a violation of petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights. In ordering the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's clinic
to serve the capiases on the employees, the County Prosecutor was acting as the
final decisionmaker for the county, and the county may therefore be held liable
under § 1983. Pp. 475 U. S. 484-485.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded in Part II-B that not every decision by
municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability.
The fact that a particular official has discretion in the exercise of
particular functions does not give rise to municipal liability based on an
exercise of that discretion unless the official is also responsible, under
state law, for establishing final governmental policy respecting such activity.
Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where -- and only where -- a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final
policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pp. 475 U. S. 481-484.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and
"official policy" is contained in
this discussion. The "official policy" requirement was intended to
distinguish acts of the municipality from
acts of employees of
the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.
Thus, Summary Judgment is proper.
FURTHER
AFFIANT SAYETH NOT
IN
THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
AFFIDAVIT
I Monzella Y. Johnson Pro Se being duly sworn on oath
states the aforementioned pleadings enumerated within said motion pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, the undersigned certifies that the
statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to
matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters,
the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that she verily believes the same to be
true.
Respectfully Submitted
Notary
____________________
Monzella Y. Johnson
Frogishtwo65@gmail.com
773 835-5849
IN
THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, } Appeal from the
United
As TRUSTEE for
securitized Trust }
States District Court for
2006-NC3, et al.
} the Northern District of
Plaintiffs
–Appellees
} Illinois, Eastern Division
V
}
No. 24 cv 12195
} No.
}
Monzella Y.
Johnson
}
Defendant-Appellant
} Judge April Perry
Certificate of Service
I Monzella Y. Johnson, Defendant-Appellant,
certify that I have on this day Electronically Emailed said Summary Judgment to all parties
recorded in said Notice via Email except Cook County Judges via Courtesy Copies
per Sheriff Police Directives to email them any and all correspondence.
Attorney General
Kwame Raoul alexandrina.shrove@ilag.gov
555 West Monroe Suite 1300
Chicago, Ill. 60601
Cook County State’s Attorney Chief Judge Timothy C. Evans
Eileen
O’Neil Burke timothy.evans@cookcountyil.gov
statesattorney@cookcountyil.gov
Cook County Sheriff’s
Tom Dart
50 West
Washington, Suite 702 email CCSO@ccsheriff.org
Chg. IL 60601
President/CEO Rick Aneshansel
US Bank Natl. Assoc. rick.aneshansel@usbank.com
Registered
Agent: Grace A. Gorka US Bank Natl.
Assoc.
190 S. LaSalle,
grace.gorka@usbank.com
ggorka@usbank.com
Chg. IL 60603
JSC_General@atgf.com Pamela Murphy-Boylan President CEO of the
(TJSC)
RPerdew@lockelord.com Lord & Locke Law Firm
simon.feng@lockelord.com Lord & Locke Law Firm
pmal@potestivolaw.com Potestivo Law Firm
chicagodocket@lockelord.com Lord & Locke Law Firm
Cook County Eviction Superintendent Colin.Luce@ccsheriff.org
CCSO Evictions CCSO.evictions@ccsheriff.org
ccc.chancerycalendar12@cookcountyil.gov Presiding Judge S. H. Hall
Sheriff’s Police Molly Adams
molly.adams@ccsheriff.org
Potestivo & Ass., PC
Bryan G. Thompson, Poulami Mal
bthompson@potestivolaw.com
223 West Jackson, Blvd, Suite
610
Chicago, IL. 60606
Cook County Clerk, Iris Y. Martinez
CCCWebsite@cookcountycourt.com
PLEASE BE ADVISED that on Jan.27, 2025 A Notice of Summary Judgment
Motion has been filed in the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit before the Honorable Justices.
Dated
Jan 27th, 2025
_________________________
Monzella Y. Johnson
Frogishtwo65@gmail.com.
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