JUDGE LYLE MANAGED TO AVOID BEING INDICTED AS AN ALLEGED CORRUPT ALDERWOMAN BUT HER LUCK HAS RUN OUT PRESIDING OVER THIS MATTER
SHE HAS VIOLATED HER OATH AND HAS CORROBORATED HER ROLE IN AN "ORGANIZED CHAIN CONSPIRACY" AIDING AND ABETTING IN A CRIMINAL ACT HELPING ATTORNEYS TO STEAL A HOME OF A RETIRED POLICE SERGEANT AND RETIRED TEACHER FROM THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
JUDGE LYLE AND HER OTHER COLLEAGUES VALADERRAMA LOZA AND THE REST OF THE CORRUPT JUDGES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS CHALLENGING THE FBI SPECIAL FORCES TO TRY AND COME AND REMOVE THEM FROM THEIR POSITIONS.
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ONLY RECRUIT AND APPOINT JUDGES OF COLOR AS PAWNS SO AS TO PROTECT THE WHITE NATIONALIST TERRORIST CONTROLLING TYRANNY IN ILLINOIS COURTS NOT ONE HISPANIC OR BLACK JUDGE HAVE AUTHORITY OVER THE WHITE MEN ORGANIZED IN POWER RESPONSIBLE FOR APPOINTING THEM TO THEIR POSITIONS BLACK AND HISPANIC JUDGES ARE ONLY SUPPOSED USED THE LAWS TO DESTROY THEIR OWN ETHNIC GROUPS AND SACRIFICE THEIR CAREERS AND LIBERTY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY BY TRESPASSING UPON ANY LAWS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS LAID OUT BY MEMBERS OF THE TERRORIST DEMOCRATIC PARTY.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY
DEPARTMENT--CHANCERY DIVISION
U.S. Bank
National Association, As Trustee Under)
Pooling
and Servicing Agreement Dated as of
)
December
1, 2006 Mastr Asset–Backed Securities )
Trust 2006-NC3
Mortgage Pass-Through )
Case # 2008 CH 33616
Certificates,
Series 2006-NC3
) Petitioner
)
) JUDGE FREDRENNA
LYLE
V.
)
)
) ROOM 2808
Monzella
Y. Johnson, A/K/A Monzella
)
Johnson; Marcia E. Johnson A/K/A Marcia )
Johnson: Mortgage Electronic Registration )
Systems,
Inc. As Nominee for New Century
)
Mortgage
Corporation; Monzella Y. Johnson
)
( C )
Cestui Que Trust; Discover Bank; )
Unknown
Owners and Non-Record Claimants, )
)
Respondents
)
RESPONDENT’S
RESPONSE MOTION REPLY OBJECTING JUDGE LYLE’S COURT ORDER DUE TO HER &
PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS “TRESPASSING UPON THE LAWS” JUDGE ACTING AS A PRIVATE
CITIZEN ENTERING COURT ORDERS VOID A NULLITY w/AFFIDAVIT
Now
comes Respondent, Monzella Y. Johnson et al. being represented Pro Se in this
cause respectfully represents to this court the reasons and files herewith her
Affidavit in support of Respondent’s Response Motion Reply Objecting judge
Lyle’s court order due to her & Plaintiffs’ “Trespassing upon the Laws”
acting as a Private Citizen entering court orders Void a Nullity w/Affidavit.
1.)
To show fraud upon the court, the complaining party must establish
that the alleged misconduct affected the integrity of the judicial process,
either because the court itself was defrauded or because the misconduct was
perpetrated by officers of the court. Alexander v. Robertson, 882, F. 2d
421,424 (9th Cir. 1989);
A-
A void judgment does not create any binding obligation.
Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L, Ed 370.
2.
That Pursuant to the Oct
20, 2017 court transcript, Page 4
Lines 11-20, Judge Lyle stated, “ The
reason that I mentioned these details is because I think it would be difficult
for the Plaintiff, who does have this file in her statement, being that that is
an indication that she – that her firm did not receive it, but she’s just
opining it –she is not swearing to it under oath et al.”
3.
That Page
10 Lines 21-24, Page 11 Lines 1-2
Judge Lyle stated, “If they have not
filed a reply, then they will just argue orally, and they will not be required
to submit it to the court, because I certainly would not – it would be late for
me to get a reply at this point. They would have to get it to me within seven
days”
4.
That Page
10 Lines 20-22, Judge Lyle stated, “And
do we have a response to that Motion for their – they got a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Did you respond?
5.
That Page
10 Lines 23-24 Ms. Shaw “I’m not
sure, your Honor. I don’t have the file in front of me”
6.
That Page 12 Lines 22-24,
Page 13 Line 1, Judge Lyle stated, “There’s
one thing that’s ripe before the court right now, and that is their Motion for
Summary Judgment”. “And I’m going to take your Motion for Reconsideration –
I’ll take that on Monday also”.
7.
That Page 16 Lines 17-22 Judge Lyle stated, “They’ve given up the right to submit in writing to me in response to
your pleading. But they have an ability and right to argue on their Motion
based on the law of the case. And that’s what I’m going to allow them to do on
Monday, if they so desire”.
A- Judge
Lyle is not making it a secret as she violates her oath violating Rules of Civil Procedure and Ill Sup Ct
Rules.
8.
That Page 17 Lines 17-20 Ms. Shaw states, “Your Honor is there any way we could get a copy of their order – well
not their order – their Motion to Reconsider in the event that my office did
not receive anything?”
A-
Pursuant to said Affidavit hereto attached as Ex A, Postestivo & Assoc. were served via Brian receptionist
September 22, 2017 at 3:10 pm by Joe Louis Lawrence.
9.
10. That Page 17 Lines 8-9 Ms. Monzella Johnson
stated, “The law says they defaulted when
they failed to honor your order period.”
11.
Pursuant to Illinois Civil Procedure Rules, failure to file an
answer, where an answer is required, results in the admission of the
allegations of the complaint, ILL. S.
Ct. R. 286 (a) Pinnacle Corp. v Village of Lake in the Hills, 258 ILL.. App. 3d
205, 196 ILL. Dec 567, 630 N.E. 2d 502 (2d Dist. 1994).
12. That Plaintiff properly plead to all facts
correctly in said Motion Striking and Objecting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry
of Default Judgment et al. w/Affidavit negates any extension of time for
the Plaintiff to respond, due to there
not being “Good Cause Shown” Bright
v. Dicke, 166 ILL. 2d 204, 209 ILL. Dec. 735 652 N.E. 2d 275 (1995).
Justice
Harrison delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue in this case is whether a circuit court may permit a
party to respond to a request for the admission of facts or the genuineness of
documents once the 28 day time limit specified by Rule 216 (C) (134 ILL. 2d R. 216 ( c) has expired. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that the court may allow an untimely response where the
delinquent party has shown good cause for the delay in accordance with Rule 183 (134 ILL. 2d R. 183) Because
No Good Cause was shown here, permission to make a late response was properly
denied. The circuit court’s order denying such permission and the judgment of
the appellate court affirming the circuit court’s order are therefore affirmed.
13.
That Page
17 Lines 13-15 Judge Lyle stated, “
well, I just want it to be clear that’s not the law. They have a right to
respond in writing. It is not mandatory that they do so”.
14. That Page 18 Lines 12-22 Ms. Monzella
stated, “I just had wanted to say when
you had spoken to us and said that we were incorrect about the law, I just had
wanted, for the record, say the law; Pursuant to 735 ILCS slash 2612. Counsel
never objected to suffiency of Petitions in our Pleadings either in form or
substance. They must be made in a trial court. And if they’re not made they’ll
be considered waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”.
15. That Page 19 Lines 2-7 Judge Lyle stated, “Again, the entire code deals with different
sections, deals with different parts of the proceeding. It deals with things
that happen in the beginning, things that happen in the middle, things that
happen in the end. And there are different regularities that regulate those
activities”
16.
That Page
19 Lines 9-13 Judge Lyle stated, “I have
discretion, every day that I take the bench to allow people additional time. I
could allow her more time to file a reply because she alleged that she didn’t
get the document that you submitted”.
17. From
the October 23, 2017 Court Transcript That Page 4 Lines 12-24, Page 5 Lines 1-2, Ms. Monzella Johnson, “Good morning. We argue on the Motion for
Reconsideration to vacate the order for September 1, 2017 – excuse me – due to
the fraud and trespassing from the laws, making order void an a nullity due to
fraud on the Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. We’ve attached our
affidavit validating the validity of our claims being properly asserted
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules, and the Rules of Illinois Civil
Procedure. One, that, that under 42 USC 1985, 3 (b) a judge does not have the
discretion of whether or not to follow the Supreme Court Rule, but a duty to
follow the rules, People versus Girshall et al.”
18.
That Page
6 Lines 17-22 Ms. Monzella Johnson, stated “And so thirdly, that the Plaintiffs have failed to comply to the
Judge’s court order, never requested leave to answer or respond later, thereby,
defaulting, and summary judgment was properly filed and served upon the
Plaintiffs in a proper and timely manner”.
19.
That Page
8 Lines 20-24, Page 9 Lines 1-13 “And
so, pursuant to the Court’s directive, when they failed, the August 23rd
– when they failed to respond –so pursuant to the court’s directive, the 23rd
– August 23, 2017 motion for Summary Judgment that we filed was – was, in fact,
filed and presented in a timely manner, because the trespassing – because the
Plaintiff appears to be replying on this Court to go along with their mess by
trespassing upon the law. And so this
was properly served”. And also, with that being said, your Honor, the
Plaintiffs have failed to follow any of your court orders, which I find just as
disrespectful as them trying to steal our home, and ask this court to
accelerate the date for default motion because Plaintiff has no credible merit
being here”. I have – they have not presented a written copy to your Honor, as
you have asked us”.
20.
That Page
9 Lines 14-15 Judge Lyle stated, “And
now, we are on the Motion for Reconsideration”?
A- That it
is clear the judge’s mind was elsewhere.
21. That Page
9 Lines 19-24, Page 10 Lines 1-5 Ms. Monzella Johnson stated, “And you had asked us to always give you a
courtesy copy. They failed to give you a courtesy copy, and we have not
received anything either. And our default and our Summary Judgment were filed
timely. And so we’re asking for the consideration of the Court to recognize, as
we have stated, that they have – I have been out of order and disrespectful to
the court as well as to us in following your orders – in failing to follow your
orders, your Honor. Thank you”.
22. That Page 10 Line 7-8 Judge Lyle stated, “Okay. Counsel, would you like to take this
opportunity to respond to her argument”?
23. That Page
10 Lines 9-22 Mr. Shleypak stated, “Yes,
briefly, your Honor. There’s no dispute that there was a scheduling order that
was set on July 18th, and that we weren’t able to file a reply by
that deadline, mainly, because, as my colleague presented on the September 1st
hearing, that we didn’t have a copy of their response in order for us reply to.
Now, I don’t dispute that they may have dropped off a copy with our office.
Something happened, and we just didn’t have one to reply to. That’s why when we
came in on September 1st, we asked for an extension of time. And
your Honor gave us the 28 days. We have complied with that order, and that
order should stand”.
A-
Counsel never denied or objected to any of the pleadings of the
Respondent thereby validating the veracity of facts properly plead.
B-
That it is a general Rule a failure to deny an allegation results
in it being admitted, in addition to this legal precedent and because they have
failed to articulate sufficient cause pursuant to In Re Estate of Michalak, 404 ILL. App 3d 75; 3d 75 ILL. Dec 373,
934 N.E. 2d 697 (1st Dist. 2010), makes it impossible for any
court to apply discretion allowing an extension of time’.
C- That
said Plaintiffs must assert some independent ground as to why their untimely
response should be allowed. Hernandez,
73 ILL. 2d at 96; Greene, 73 ILL. 2d at 107;
D- That Rule 183 does give judge’s discretion
to allow responses to be served beyond the 28 day limit, that discretion does
not come into play under the rule unless the responding party can first show
good cause for the extension. Hernandez v. Power Construction Co. (1978) 73
ILL. 2d 90, 95-97).
24.
That
Page 10 Line 23-24 Ms. Monzella
Johnson stated, “Excuse me ma’am I object
– Counsel was saying—“
A-
That Judge Lyle never sustained or overruled any objections the
Defendants made in court.
25. That Page
11, Line 1 Judge Lyle stated, “Now—
26.
That Page
11 Line 10-11 Ms. Monzella Johnson stated, “I’m sorry. I thought he had finished his sentence”.
27.
That
Page 11 Lines 16-20 Mr. Shleypak
stated, “And as your Honor had mentioned,
at the September 1st hearing, this is just a common courtesy that
the parties do amongst themselves, ask for an extension of time when something
goes missing”.
A-
It is the counsels’ admission before the court it is a normal
practice for them to “Trespass upon
the Laws” violate their oaths and engage in “Treason” as innocent citizens who are victims in the courts
have their Civil Rights Violated.
B-
On the judges Court order
it states “A responding party who fails
to file a written response will not be permitted to argue orally”.
C-
Also, it states, “The court will not consider requests for
extensions of time which are made on the hearing date”.
D- The
court directs the parties’ attention to the general standing orders of the
Mortgage Foreclosure/Mechanics Lien Section which govern all filings in this
case. Motions or Briefs may be stricken
for violation of this order.
28. That said attorney had the audacity to try and
pass off a “Fraudulent” document that was purportedly e filed, in that Page 28
Lines 15-19 Judge Lyle stated, “The Motion for Reconsideration, asking me to
vacate the September 1st order, I’m going to deny, because they, in
fact, did –they did comply with the September 1st order by getting
it filed;
A-
This scheme may have worked on persons with challenges in the laws
or ordinary Pro se individuals but not on a retired Police sergeant, pursuant
to the document tendered in court, Page
33 Line 5-6 Mr. Shleypak stated, “Your
Honor, I’m willing to give them my copy”.
B-
Judge Lyle, stated, Page 33 Lines 7-9 “You’ve got
a copy. I just want to make sure you get one now. Then he’s going to give it to
you right now.”
C-
That said document purported to being a properly e filed document
was a “FRAUD” it states in the upper
right hand corner ELECTRONICALLY FILED
9/29/2017 6:29 pm Page 1 of 2 there are no additional pages noted;
D-
That an additional FRAUDULENT DOCUMENT WAS E FILED, hereto
attached, another ELECTRONICALLY FILED
document 9/29/2017 6:22pm Page 1 of 44 but at the bottom CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, I Artapong
Sriratana an attorney, certify ………depositing the same in the U.S. mail at
223 W. Jackson Street …….before the hour of 5:00 pm on February 5, 2015 with
proper postage prepaid.
29.
That
Page 11 Line 24, Page 12 Line 1 Ms.
Monzella stated, “Yes I wanted to object.”
A-
That is why Judge Lyle did everything in her unlawful power trying
t to confuse the issues of what the Defendants had properly argued in her
court;
B-
That the judge and attorneys assumed the Defendants were ignorant
of the laws when in fact it was their ignorance trying to use the laws and a
crooked judge in trying to steal said home!
C-
30. That Page
13 Lines 2-9 Judge Lyle stated, “All
right. We are looking at Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration to Vacate my
Order of September 1st, which allowed them 28 days or until
September 29th, to reply to your Motion for Summary Judgment. It is
clear, and Counsel has acknowledged that they, in fact, did not file a reply.
That however, is not grounds for me to vacate an order giving them time to
reply.”
31. That Page
16 Lines 3-8 Judge Lyle stated, “And
so that’s why I’m saying, that’s one of the problems that we’re having. I’m
trying to keep everything straight. So it’s response to pleading, basically,
it’s a Motion to Strike their Motion for Summary Judgment. Did you respond to
that”?
32. That Page
16 Lines 9-10 Mr. Shleypak stated,”
That’s why we didn’t respond”
Pursuant to Roth v Roth, 45 ILL. 2d 19, 256 N.E. 838 (1970),
Pleading—Failure to respond to adversary pleading may
constitute admission of all
facts pleaded. As a purpose of pleading is to develop the issues to be determined,
a failure to respond to an adversary pleading may constitute an admission of
all facts well pleaded by the adversary, and admissions thus drawn from failure
to plead may be considered as evidence. (See Mooney v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 33 ILL. 2d 566. People ex rel. Lacanski v. Backes, 19 ILL. 2d 541, 543;
see also, ILL. Rev Stat. 1967, ch 110 par. 40 (2); Nichols, Illinois Civil
Practice, 1960, sec 1233.
33. That
Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed on September 11, 2008 and the First Amended
Complaint was filed June 7, 2016”.
A-
That on the face of Plaintiff’s legal instrument demonstrates 735
ILCS 5/13-205 is applicable to the aforementioned matter;
34.
Plaintiffs never challenged or attempted to
vacate the courts order vacating the June 2, 2010 Foreclosure judgment,
pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2 1301 an untimely motion to vacate judgment
will ordinarily be construed as petition for relief from final judgment under
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.
Lodolce v. Central Du Page Hosp., App. 2 Dist. 1991, 159 Ill. Dec. 789, 216
Ill. App. 3d 902, 576 N. E. 2d 458, appeal denied 164 Ill. Dec. 918 et al.
35.
That the Plaintiffs had a number of
attorneys to appear before the court inducing reliance without filing
appearances in an attempt to bully and intimidate the defendant’s accepted the
aforementioned order which is deemed a judgment of June 2, 2010---where
judgment was entered in trial court at time when plaintiff was represented by
counsel and defendant was in court in person, and judgment order was okayed by
defendant in person and by plaintiff through his attorney, judgment was not
void. Nicholson v. Lowenstein, App.
1966, 77 Ill. App. 2d 97, 222 N. E. 2d 157, certiorari denied 88 S. Ct. 62, 389
U.S. 825 et al.
36. That
pursuant to ILCS 5/2-1401 (a) is germane in this cause, in that said order was
never challenged or vacated whereby any court order entered after this order is
Void a Nullity
A- That on June 2, 2010 Court order signed by
Cook County Judge Pamela Gillespie ”The
court on its own motion vacates the judgment of foreclosure for lack of a
proper affidavit in support”
37. That
the Plaintiffs are expecting this court to ignore the Defendants legal
affidavits and meritorious defenses and deny anything they submit and continue
to “Trespass upon the Laws” and
corroborate their roles in an “Organized
Conspiracy” engaging in “Treason”
due to their skin color being African American and the fact they are Pro se and
that Judge Lyle has demonstrated her allegiance to the Democratic Party as a “Trespasser of the Laws” entering
orders Void in nature a Nullity assisting the Plaintiffs;
Section 2-1401 also codifies the common law that a void order can be
attacked at any time. The petitioner does not have to allege facts to
support a meritorious defense or the exercise of due diligence to vacate a void
order. Since a void order is a nullity from its inception, the order will have
no legal effect. The most common example of a void order is one where the court
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter or
parties. A court will not set aside a judgment lightly. Courts are mindful that
collaterally attacking judgments could have disastrous consequences in an
orderly administration of justice. Thus a court will only void an order if
there is no other alternative. Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill. 2d 371, 827 N.E. 2d 422, 292 Ill. Dec 893
(2005).
38. That the Plaintiffs have exhausted every
method unimaginable trying to steal Defendant’s home in the disguise of “Foreclosure” in spite of the
laws demonstrating “Fraud” and that
the Defendants are entitled to Equal of Protection of the Laws in Illinois,
pursuant to Federal statutes;
In order to determine whether trial court has
abused its discretion in deciding motion for leave to file amended complaint,
Appellate Court looks at the following four factors: 1) whether proposed
amendment would cure defective pleading; 2.) whether other parties would
sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of proposed amendment; 3.) whether
proposed amendment is timely; and 4.) whether previous opportunities to amend
pleading could be identified. McHale v.
W. D. Trucking, Inc., App 1 Dist. 2015,
396 Ill. Dec 46, 39 N. E. 3d 595, appeal denied et al.
A-
That attorney Dutton, Barbara never at any time filed a timely
appearance pursuant to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedures every appearance
shall be filed within the time fixed by the rule of the Supreme Court;
B-
That because the attorneys as demonstrated in this manner have
been able to mislead the court successfully the court never had
jurisdiction on the original complaint;
thereby, nullifying any legal action in this matter due to diabolical acts of “Fraud”
Fraud admissibility great
latitude is permitted in proving fraud C.J.S. Fraud 104 ET Seg. Fraud 51-57.
where a question of fraud and deceit is the issue involved in a case, great
latitude is ordinarily permitted in the introduction of evidence, and courts
allow the greatest liberality in the method of examination and in
the scope
of inquiry Vigus
V. O’Bannon, 1886 8 N.E 788, 118 ILL 334. Hazelton V. Carolus, 1907 132 ILL.
App. 512. Pursuant to this precedent, hereto attached, Gr Ex A In the
matter of Elena Fedorova v. Chicago Community Management, Inc. et al.14-L 3632
Petition to Vacate Void Judgment actual assertions of judges acting as
“Trespassers of the Laws”.
Hereto
attached Gr Ex B Motion for Reinstatement of Default & Summary judgment due to
Judge Valderrama Trespassing upon the Laws Committing Treason Making the Order
“Void A Nullity” w/Affidavit, the case was never reassigned back to him from
Judge Mikva’s court, Judge Valderrama entered orders outside of his
jurisdiction “fixing” it for the Defendant’s DENIED Plaintiff’s Motion hereto
attached court order;
1.)
In that said, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise.
U. S. v. Murphy, 768 F. 2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985). In that, said judges are now
deemed as “Organized Terrorist”
“Since judges who do not report the criminal
activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity, 18
U.S.C. Section 1, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of
the judges who have been convicted, the other judges are as guilty as the
convicted judges”
2.) That
because of the continuous unlawful acts of so many Democratic judges engaging
in “Treason” When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or
they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction),
they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason.
3.) That
because of the aforementioned continuous acts of Democratic judges not
following the laws of the United States Constitution they continue to “Trespass
upon the Laws” engaging in “Treason”.
INDUCING RELIANCE
To
prevail in a cause of action for fraud, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant
made statement of material nature which was relied on by victim and was made
for purposes of inducing reliance, and that victim’s reliance led to his
injury. Parsons
V. Winter, 1986, 1 Dist., 491 N.E. 2d 1236, 96 ILL Dec. 776, 142 ILL App 3d
354, Appeal Denied.
In Carter V. Mueller 457 N.E. 2d 1335 ILL.
App. 1 Dist. 1983 The Supreme Court has held that: “The elements of a cause of
action for fraudulent misrepresentation (sometimes referred to as “fraud and
deceit” or deceit) are: (1) False statement of material fact; (2) known or
believed to be false by the party making it; (3) intent to induce the other
party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the
statement; and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance.
U. S Sup Court Digest 24(1) General Conspiracy
U.S. 2003. Essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful
act.—U.S. v. Jimenez Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 537 U.S. 270, 154 L.Ed.2d 744, on
remand 371F.3d 1093
Agreement to commit an
unlawful act, which constitutes the essence of a conspiracy, is a distinct evil
that exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.-Id.
Conspiracy poses a threat
to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant
substantive crime, both because the combination in crime makes more likely the
commission of other crimes and because it decreases the part from their path of
criminality.-Id.
CONSPIRACY
Fraud maybe inferred from nature of acts complained of,
individual and collective interest of alleged conspirators, situation,
intimacy, and relation of parties at time of commission of acts, and generally
all circumstances preceding and attending culmination of claimed conspiracy Illinois Rockford
Corp. V. Kulp, 1968, 242 N.E. 2d 228, 41 ILL. 2d 215.
Conspirators to be guilty of
offense need not have entered into conspiracy at same time or have taken part
in all its actions. People V. Hardison, 1985, 911 Dec. 162, 108. Requisite
mens rea elements of conspiracy are
satisfied upon showings of agreement of offense with intent that offense be committed; Actus reas element is satisfied of act in
furtherance of agreement People V. Mordick, 1981, 50 ILL, Dec. 63
Supreme Court Rule [137]
provides in pertinent part:
If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filling of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney fee. Not only will the courts consider an award of sanctions for
active false statements: failures to disclose material facts to the court can
also justify an award of sanctions.
BRUBAKKEN v. Morrison, No. 1-9-1670, 1992 Ill App. LEXIS 2144 (1st Dist. Dec. 30, 1992).
Additionally, the fact that a false statement or omission is the result of an
honest mistake is no defense to entry of a sanction. ID. To the extent that an
individual lawyer has engaged in sanctionable conduct, that lawyer’s firm can also
be jointly and severally liable with the lawyer.
In that every attorney has
properly admitted to every assertion properly presented in all Affidavits and
Motions but some judges are still operating and enforcing Jim Crow Laws trying
to steal said home.
The
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Wednesday April 26, 2006, Page 1, Illinois
Political Machines help breed corruption, Associated Press writer Deanna
Bellandi states, “Illinois is apparently a Petri dish for corruption. It
is a real breeding ground”.
That Chicago
is the most Corrupt City in America, Huffington Post, Internet
Newspaper, February 23, 2012; University of Illinois Professor Dick Simpson, “The
two worst crime zones in Illinois are the governor’s mansion…..and the City
Council Chambers in Chicago.” Simpson a former Chicago Alderman told the AP “no
other State can match us.”
In
Accordance to all of The Cook County Circuit Court Rules
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE
RELIEF REQUESTED
TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW
The
Illinois Supreme Court has held that "if the magistrate has not such
jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his
process, are trespassers." Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109
(1870)
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928).
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below).
The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... It is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse." When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928).
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below).
The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... It is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse." When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator
or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without
violating his undertaking to support it.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.
Ct. 1401 (1958).
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason. Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason. Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
TREASON
Whenever
a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is
engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101
S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat)
264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
Any
judge or attorney who does not report the above judges for treason as required
by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section
2382.
The
canons of ethic in the Rules of Professional Conduct constitute a safe guide
for professional conduct, and attorneys may be disciplined for not observing
them. In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531,
533 N.E.2d 790, 127 Ill.
Dec 708 (1988). Although they represent the best thoughts of the organized bar,
it has been held that these canons are non-enforceable other than through the
disciplinary proceedings. Ettinger v. Rolewick, 140 Ill.App.3d 295, 488 N.E.2d
598, 94 Ill.Dec.599 (1st Dist. 1986). Disciplinary proceedings and
sanctions are strictly within the province of the Supreme Court. Reed Yates Farms, Inc. v. Yates, 172
Ill.App.3d 519, 526 N.E2d 1115, 122 Ill.Dec 576 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, the Illinois Supreme
Court, through its disciplinary arm, the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission, is the only forum for exacting such punishment. Beale v. Edgemark Financial Corp., 297 Ill. App. 3d 999, 697 N.E.2d 820, 232 Ill. Dec. 78 (1st Dist. 1998).
The ultimate authority to regulate and define the practice of law rests with
the Supreme Court. Perto v. Board of
Review, Illinois Department of Employment Security, 274 Ill.
App.3d 485, 654 N.E.2d 232, 210 Ill. Dec. 933
(2d Dist.), appeal denied, 164 Ill. 2d 581 (1995).
Ethics
All Illinois
lawyers must be familiar with the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct,
and trail lawyers must be particularly familiar with the rules that apply
specially to them.
RPC
3.3, entitled “Conduct before a Tribunal,” sets forth the
standards to be followed by the trial lawyer during “battle.” Section (a) of
that rule states:
(a) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not:
(1) make a statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know is false;
(2) fail to disclose to a
tribunal a material fact known to the lawyer when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel;
(4) Offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes
to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures;
(5) participate in the
creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know the evidence is false ;
(6) counsel or assist the
client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal of fraudulent;
(7) engage in other illegal
conduct or conduct in violation of these Rules;
(8) fail to disclose the
identities of the clients represented and of the persons who employed the
lawyer unless such information is privileged or irrelevant;
(9) intentionally degrade a
witness or other person by stating or alluding to personal facts concerning
that person which are not relevant to the case;
(10) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as
a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
innocence of and accused, but a lawyer may argue, on analysis of evidence, for
any position or conclusion with respect to the matter stated herein;
Acts constituting direct, criminal
contempt
A wide variety of acts may constitute a direct, criminal
contempt. And act may be criminal contempt even though it is also an indictable
crime. Beattie v. People, 33 Ill. App 651, 1889 WL
2373 (1st Dist. 1889). As is making false representations to the
court. People v. Katelhut, 322 Ill. App. 693, 54 N.E.2d
590 (1st Dist. 1944). Misconduct of an officer of the court is
punishable as contempt. People ex rel.
Rusch v. Levin, 305 Ill.
App. 142, 26 N.E. 2d 895 (1st Dist. 1939).
Official
misconduct is a criminal offense; and a public officer or employee commits
misconduct, punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both, when, in his official
capacity, he intentionally or recklessly fails to perform any mandatory duty as
required by law; or knowingly performs an act which he knows he is forbidden by
law to perform; or with intent to obtain a personal advantage for himself or
another, he performs an act in excess of his lawful authority ….S.H.A. Ch 38
33-3.
False statements
Censure was recommended sanction for
attorney who engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, made statement of
material fact or law to tribunal which she knew or reasonably should have known
to be false, and failed to disclose to tribunal a material fact known to her
when disclosure was necessary to avoid assisting criminal or fraudulent at by
client, given that attorney’s misconduct was not result of dishonest or corrupt
motive, but of misguided attempt to accommodate clients. 99 Ill.Atty.Reg. & Disc.Comm. SH11
Three-year suspension was
recommended sanction for attorney who engaged in conduct involving dishonesty
and fraud, made statement of material fact to tribunal which he knew or
reasonably should have known was false, and offered evidence that he knew to be
false and failed to take reasonable remedial measures. 96 Ill.Atty.Reg. &
Disc.Comm. SH 358.
Disbarment was recommended sanction
for attorney who engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, made false statements
of material fact or law to tribunal which she knew were false and engaged in
conduct which tended to defeat administration of justice. 95 Ill Atty.Reg. & Disc.Comm. CH 877.
Censure was recommended sanction for
attorney who made statements of material fact or law known was false, and
engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 95
Ill Atty.Reg. & Disc.Comm. CH 504
One-year suspension was recommended sanction for attorney who made
statement of material fact which he knew was false in appearing in professional
capacity before tribunal, made a statement of material fact which he knew to be
false in course of representing client, and engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty. 95 Ill Atty.Reg. &
Disc.Comm. CH 191.
Disbarment was recommended sanction
for attorney who engaged in serious misconduct by making misrepresentation
during his divorce proceedings and who was a recidivist. 94 Ill.Atty.Reg. & Disc.Comm. SH469
Fraud on court
Two-year suspension, retroactive to beginning of interim
suspension, was recommended sanction for attorney who made statement of
material fact or law to tribunal which lawyer knew or reasonably should have
known to be false, instituted criminal charges as prosecutor when he knew or
reasonably should have known that charges were not supported by probable cause,
committed criminal act that reflected adversely upon lawyer ‘s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as lawyer, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, engaged in conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice, and engaged in conduct which tended to bring courts
or legal profession into disrepute. 96 Ill. Atty. Reg. &
Disc. Comm. CH 118.
Under
penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 1265 5\1-109, the undersigned
certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and
correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief
and as to such matters, the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes
the same to be true.
Respectfully submitted,
Monzella Y. Johnson,
Pro Se
5217 S. Ingleside Ave
Chicago, Il 60615
773 835-5849
WHEREFORE the aforementioned
reasons Defendant respectfully Prays for the Relief
1.
For an Order Reinstating Defendant’s Default and Summary
judgment with Prejudice
2.
For an Order Imposing Sanctions in accordance to Sup Ct. Rule
137 for deliberate misrepresentations to the court;
3.
For the entry of an Order awarding to your Defendant for
such other relief and any other relief necessary as equity may require of which
this court may deem overwhelmingly just;
Under
penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 1265 5\1-109, the undersigned
certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and
correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief
and as to such matters, the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily
believes the same to be true.
Respectfully Submitted,
Monzella Y. Johnson, Pro Se
5217
S. Ingleside Ave
Chicago, Il 60615
773 835-5849
IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS
COUNTY
DEPARTMENT--CHANCERY DIVISION
U.S. Bank
National Association, As Trustee Under)
Pooling
and Servicing Agreement Dated as of
)
December
1, 2006 Mastr Asset–Backed Securities )
Trust
2006-NC3 Mortgage Pass-Through
) Case # 2008 CH 33616
Certificates,
Series 2006-NC3 )
Petitioner
)
)
V.
) JUDGE FREDRENNA LYLE
)
)
Monzella
Y. Johnson, A/K/A Monzella
) ROOM 2808
Johnson; Marcia E. Johnson A/K/A Marcia )
Johnson: Mortgage Electronic Registration )
Systems,
Inc. As Nominee for New Century
)
Mortgage
Corporation; Monzella Y. Johnson
)
( C )
Cestui Que Trust; Discover Bank; )
Unknown
Owners and Non-Record Claimants, )
)
Respondents
)
NOTICE
OF
RESPONDENT’S
RESPONSE MOTION REPLY OBJECTING JUDGE LYLE’S COURT ORDER DUE TO HER &
PLAINTIFFS’ “TRESPASSING UPON THE LAWS”
ACTING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN ENTERING COURT ORDERS VOID A NULLITY w/AFFIDAVIT
Please be
advised that on Nov. 15, 2017, Defendant has filed before this Circuit
Court, Motion Striking & Objecting Plaintiff’s Motion et al; and will
present said legally sufficient instrument before Judge Lyles or any Judge in her
stead 12-6- 2017, at 10:30 am in room 2808.
U.S. Attorney
John Lausch
219 South Dearborn Suite
500
Chicago, Ill 60605
Cook County State’s
Attorney Chief
Judge Timothy C. Evans
Kim
Foxx 50 West Washington, Suite 2600
50 West Washington, Suite 500 Chicago, Ill. 60601
Chicago, Ill. 60601
Potestivo & Ass., PC
223 West Jackson, Blvd, Suite
610
Chicago, IL. 60606
Chicago, IL. 60606
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
The
undersigned hereby certifies that the above notice and all attachments were
caused to be personally delivered, to the above parties at the addresses
provided before 5:00 pm on Nov. 15, 2017.
________________________
Respectfully Submitted, Monzella Y. Johnson
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY
DEPARTMENT--CHANCERY DIVISION
U.S. Bank
National Association, As Trustee Under)
Pooling
and Servicing Agreement Dated as of )
December
1, 2006 Mastr Asset–Backed Securities )
Trust
2006-NC3 Mortgage Pass-Through
) Case # 2008 CH 33616
Certificates,
Series 2006-NC3
)
Petitioner
)
)
V.
) JUDGE FREDRENNA LYLE
)
) ROOM 2808
Monzella
Y. Johnson, A/K/A Monzella )
Johnson; Marcia E. Johnson A/K/A Marcia )
Johnson: Mortgage Electronic Registration )
Systems,
Inc. As Nominee for New Century )
Mortgage
Corporation; Monzella Y. Johnson
)
( C )
Cestui Que Trust; Discover Bank; )
Unknown
Owners and Non-Record Claimants, )
)
Respondents
)
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
)
COUNTY OF COOK )
I Monzella Y. Johnson Pro Se being duly sworn
on oath states the aforementioned pleadings enumerated within said motion
pursuant to 735 1265 5/1-109, the undersigned certifies that the statements set
forth in this instrument are true
and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and
belief and as to such matters, the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he
verily believes the same to be true.
Respectfully Submitted
Notary
____________________
Monzella Y. Johnson
5217 S. Ingleside. Ave
Chicago, Il 60615
773 835-5849
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
)
COUNTY OF COOK )
I Joe
Louis Lawrence, Counsel Pro Se being duly sworn on oath states.
1.)
That on September 22, 2017 at 3:10pm a copy of Respondents’
Re Notice Motion for Summary Judgment due to “Fraud” et al. Motion for Default
and Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration Vacate (September 1st
2017) order et al. was served on Bryan a Caucasian male in mid 40’s at 223 West
Jackson, Blvd Suite 610, Chicago, Ill.
2.)
That the
surveillance cameras would verify each time and date Joe Louis acted as a
Special Process Server entered and departed from the building.
3.)
That in order to get close to Bryan you have to be buzzed
in which is how service was effected placed in his hands.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT
Respectfully Submitted
Notary
____________________
Joe Louis Lawrence
P. O. Box 490075
Chicago, Il. 60649-0075
312 965-6455
Twitter @joelouis7
Email joelouislaw@yahoo.com
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