PRESIDENT OBAMA WILL PROBABLY REGRET APPOINTING THIS WOMAN TO BECOMING A FEDERAL JUDGE THEIR ARE BLACKS ALONG WITH SOME HISPANICS ARE MORE RACIST TOWARDS THEIR OWN ETHNIC GROUPS SO AS TO BE ACCEPTED BY WHITE;

THE SECRET IN CHICAGO IS THAT THERE ARE MORE BLACKS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC MACHINE AS JUDGES OR POLITICIANS HARBORS A HATE TOWARDS THEIR OWN ETHNICITY THAN MANY WANT TO ACCEPT OR ADDRESS.

IN ORDER FOR MANY BLACKS OR HISPANICS TO ADVANCE IN THEIR PROFESSIONS THEY MUST DESTROY THEIR OWN PEOPLE SO THAT THE WHITE NATIONALIST CONTROLLING THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY MAINTAIN TERRORIST CONTROL IN KEEPING THE COMMUNITIES SEGREGATED.

TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT THIS CASE PERFECT EXAMPLE TO THE AFOREMENTIONED

HERE IS A MAN OF COLOR (LEE OTIES LOVE, JR. @redbilla)  SEEKING VISITATION OF HIS DAUGHTER IT IS NOW 4 YEARS HISPANIC JUDGE FILLED WITH HATE AND RACISM ALONG WITH OTHERS NAMED TRESPASSED UPON THE LAWS HAD HIM  LOCKED UP, CRIMINALIZED HIM FOR STANDING UP TO RACISM AND INJUSTICE.

WHEN HE SOUGHT THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND WENT UP BEFORE JUDGE SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN AN AFRICAN AMERICAN FEMALE READ HOW SHE ENDORSED RACISM HATE CORRUPTION SURPASSING HUMAN IMAGINATION AS SHE DENIED HIS MOTION AS SHE ELOQUENTLY TRESPASSED UPON THE LAWS BECAUSE THE HATE FOR HETEROSEXUAL MEN OR WOMEN AND INDEPENDENT CAUCASIANS IS NOT TOLERATED BY THIS PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.

THERE ARE ALLEGEDLY MORE RACIST PERSONS IN THE CLOSET LIKE THE ABOVE BLACKS AND HISPANICS THAN ANYONE CAN IMAGINE AND ARE WORSE THAN ANY NAZI OR KLANSMAN.

READ FOR YOURSELF.

                                                          IN THE

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                         FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

                                            CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

  

 Lee Oties Love, Jr.                                               } Appeal from the United      

                                                                               } States District Court for      

  Plaintiff –Appellant                                             } the Northern District of   

                                                                               } Illinois, Eastern Division

    V                                                                        }

                                                                               } No. 1:17-cv-05482

Supreme Court of Illinois, et al.                            }

                                                                               }

 Defendants-Appellees                                          } Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge

                                  

September 7, 2017  

                                                   BRIEF MEMORANDUM

TO: Court of Appeals

FROM: Lee Oties Love, Jr.

CC:   All parties referenced in the Certificate of Service

SUBJECT:  Why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction:                                                                           

                                       

1.)   A federal court always has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A federal court has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a particular case. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing United States v. Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)). • In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947) (“‘[A] court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’”).

See also Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)) (“‘[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.’”). In re Bunyan, 354 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)) (“A federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”). 13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3536, p. 1 (“‘Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court to determine whether it has authority over the parties to and the subject matter of a suit.”) [here in after 13D Wright & Miller]. 4 B. Unique Aspects of Jurisdiction in Practice The issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction “concerns the fundamental constitutional question of the allocation of judicial power between the federal and state governments.”

2.)   Wright & Miller § 3522, p. 125. Because of these weighty concerns, jurisdiction is a unique issue in the federal courts. Below, this outline notes five ways that adjudication of jurisdiction is different than adjudication of substantive issues. 1. A federal court must generally determine whether it has jurisdiction at the outset of litigation and must always make this determination before deciding the merits of a particular case. A court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in the suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) . . . .” Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (declining to address jurisdiction and holding that district court had authority to dismiss action on forum non conveniens grounds before considering the merits) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998) (rejecting doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction” that would allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating jurisdiction)). • Toeller v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 461 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Before considering the merits of [the] appeal, we must resolve a preliminary question of appellate jurisdiction.”). Jurisdiction Upheld • Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (quoting Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir.2008)) (“‘Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.’”). Jurisdiction Lacking Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (“As a threshold matter, we must decide whether we have jurisdiction . . . .”). • 13 Wright & Miller § 3522, p. 147. See also a. Exception: In some circumstances (lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens) a court can dismiss a case on non-merits grounds before deciding whether jurisdiction exists.

3.)   Although courts must generally decide a jurisdictional issue before deciding the merits of a case, “a federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to 5 a case on the merits.’” Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). So, while a court cannot consider the merits of a case before deciding a jurisdictional issue, a court can decide a case on non-merits grounds before deciding whether jurisdiction exists. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized two “threshold grounds” on which a court can resolve a case without addressing subject matter jurisdiction: (1) personal jurisdiction and (2) forum non conveniens. Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (“Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry.”); Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (applying exception to forum non conveniens).

4.)   The Ninth Circuit has held that the personal-jurisdiction exception to the jurisdiction-first rule is limited to cases where deciding the personal jurisdiction issue would result in the end of the case. Special Invs., Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2004). In Special Investments, the court held that it was improper for the district court to dismiss an action against a defendant when other defendants remained without first deciding whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The D.C. Circuit has provided a test to determine when a court can decide an issue before adjudicating jurisdiction: a court can decide an issue before jurisdiction if the issue does not involve “an exercise of a court’s law-declaring power . . . .” See Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

5.)   A court exercises its law-declaring power when a ruling has an effect on “primary conduct.” See id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (classifying rules affecting “primary decisions respecting human conduct” as substantive for purposes of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

6.)   That said judge violated the oath of her duties recognizing she had jurisdiction as she “Trespassed upon the Laws” by corroborating her role in an “Organized Conspiracy” engaging in “Treason” Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer.  The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

8.)   Plaintiff stated, Page 3, Par 14-18 from the transcript, “And the reason why I’m here is that me, the defendant is petitioning rule to show cause remanding Circuit Court judge Pamela Elizabeth Loza and attorneys are trespassing upon the law, corroboration in an organized chain conspiracy of treason, fraud of all sorts..” Line 19 Judge Coleman stated, “I need to stop you right there”, Line 23-24, She stated, “Okay, I have read, read some of it. I read you even though it looked like a filing” Page 4, Par 11-12, Judge Coleman stated, “when you dealt with them, were they – they were judges and it was in court, is that correct?” Plaintiff’s reply Line 13, “Yes Ma’am” Lines 14-16, Judge Coleman stated, “All right. Well, they have immunity. You cannot sue them for anything that happened in the case. You can’t sue them personally” Line 18-19 she further stated, “So they cannot---I have dismiss to them out. I have no jurisdiction over them. Do you understand?”    

Judge Coleman stated, Page 6, Par 2 “You understand I answer to the U.S. Supreme Court.”

The District court closed her eyes to the “VOID ORDERS” entered against the Plaintiff and entered an order described as a nullity.

 9.)   In addition, when judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason.

A-     Pursuant to {28 USCA 144, 455 (B) (1)} Sufficient for Removal, conduct which does not constitute a criminal offense may be sufficiently violative of the Judicial Canons to warrant removal for cause. Napolitano v Ward, 457 F 2d 279 (7^th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1037, 93 S. Ct. 512, 34 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1972), that said District Court judge methodically violated her oath by stating said Plaintiff dismissed his own case when in fact Page 4, Lines 18, 19, Judge Coleman stated, “I have dismiss to them out. I have no jurisdiction over them. Do you understand?”  

B.     That Page 6, Lines 12-17, Judge stated, “You have crossed over into the Federal court, and I deal with national issues. I don’t deal with domestic relations and child support unless it’s a usually international case or maybe even people in maybe different states, but usually not someone coming to me directly from the Circuit Court of Cook County”.

C.     That Page 7, Lines 3-6, Plaintiff stated, “Which I don’t understand according to law that they denied my written mandamus. But the thing about that is it was, it was not signed by a judge”.

D.    That Page 7, Lines 7-8, 10-14 Judge stated, “I’m not the Illinois Supreme Court.” “And I don’t tell them how ----and usually if they don’t sign something, and I don’t know if they had a signature on that, sometimes they issue orders that are not opinions that they can sign. I don’t know. I’ve never been on the Illinois Supreme Court, and I don’t work for them”.

E.     That from the Complaint captioned Complaint of Civil Rights Violations, Trespassing of the Laws, Treason et al. said June 6, 2017, Ex’s 1-3 orders from the Sup. Ct. attached as exhibits corroborating said assertions not signed by any judge but cc’d to all parties.

 Pursuant to Sup Ct. Rule 272 “if at the time of announcing final judgment  the judge requires the submission of a form of written judgment to be signed by the judge et al” the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed— Judges are bound by this rule before their court orders are valid;

F.      In furtherance to the aforementioned, Plaintiff had to appear before a probationary officer August 30, 2017 where his prior caseworker Claudia Swan had taken a medical leave and Robert Eizenga was the new case worker and discovered Judge Thomas Panici had charged Plaintiff with a DUI case # 15 C 660004301 12-18-14 and 12-17-15 District 6 room 103, Plaintiff not only never appeared before this judge but he does not drink alcohol;

G.    That on the same related case number SS16600043-00 there was a fine charge of $1200.00 Seq# 001 24 months a clerk by the name of Thomas entered this information;

H.    That as a result to the terrorist acts perpetrated at the Plaintiff by Democrats organized by powerful men and women racist in nature and spirit, hereto attached Gr Ex B Motion for Supervisory Order by Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, for the Office of the State Appellate Defender;

I.        Said Deputy Defender stated, Par 6, Page 3 “He should not be denied his right to an appeal due to a series of bureaucratic errors that were not his fault”

J.       Citing Canon 2A the court noted, “[a] court’s indifference to clearly stated rules breeds disrespect for and discontent with our justice system. Government cannot demand respect of the laws by its citizens when its tribunals ignore those very same laws”)

K.    That said District Court judge had her Deputy Clerk to notify the Plaintiff twice at his home making sure he appeared in court at 8:30am but never notified any of the Defendants to appear before her;

L.      The District Court demonstrating an act of Improprieties in an attempt to aid and assist said Defendant’s  named in Suit, In Re Judge No. 93-154, 440 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 1994), And Deception by falsifying reasons for preventing a legally sufficient Complaint and Motion from being served on Appellee’s, In re Ferrara, 582 N.W. 2d 817 (Mich. 1998),In re Renfer, 493 S.E. 2d 434 (N.C. 1997), In re Kroger, 702 A. 2d 64 (Vt. 1997), Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 33 Cal. 3d 359, 657 P. 2d 372, 377, 188 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1983).

M.   Section 1983 of U.S.C.S. contemplates the depravation of Civil Rights through the Unconstitutional Application of a Law by conspiracy or otherwise. Mansell v. Saunders (CA 5 F 1A) 372 F 573, especially if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect, where an action is for a conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1985 (3), or for the depravation of such rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect and plaintiff was thereby deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and Laws, the gist of the action may be treated as one for the depravation of rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, Lewis v. Brautigam (CA 5 F 1a) 227 F 2d 124, 55 Alr 2d 505, John W. Strong, 185, 777-78 (4 th ed. 1992)

N.    That the Judge erred considerably when it received notice and knowledge of other Judges complicit in a Criminal Conspiracy failed to follow Canon Ethics Leslie W. Abramson, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 751 (1997). The Judges Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges and Lawyers and its effect on Judicial Independence.

O.    That because many white nationalist have infiltrated the Democratic party and has methodically overturned the legal tribunal recruiting the necessary persons who will keep their mouths shut and continue the terrorist mayhem on innocent citizens fighting injustice in the courts;

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court   of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,     1531 (7th Cir. 1985).

The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge "Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago". Bracey v. Gramley, case No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).

Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 2, 3 & 4, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of the judges who have been convicted, the other judges are as guilty as the convicted judges.

The criminal activities that the Federal Courts found in the Circuit Court of Cook County still exist, and are today under the care, custody and control of Judge Timothy C. Evans (Chief Judge). The Circuit Court of Cook County remains a criminal enterprise.

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act, or for their administrative/ 
ministerial duties. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act, he is performing a ministerial act.

Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge's connivance with, aiding and abetting, another judge's criminal activity.

TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers." Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870)

Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it, had no authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed below had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them. They acted without any jurisdiction.

When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below).

The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... It is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."

When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].

By law, a judge is a state officer.

The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

VIOLATION OF OATH OF OFFICE

In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states "Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'"

In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that "The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'"

Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows: "I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; ...".

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).

Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).

If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason. 

TREASON

Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

What is the penalty for treason?

18 U.S. Code § 2381 – Treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(2) (J), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2148.)

Attorney General Sessions: Actions “from racial bigotry and hatred….cannot be tolerated an innocent 32 year old Caucasian woman was killed as white nationalist banded together seeking white supremacy in Charlottesville Virginia. In Chicago any nonwhite person who closes their eyes and jurisdiction to a person of color seeking jurisdiction and protection to the very mayhem of racial hatred is a colored version of the very hate groups that is being denounced in that city is all the reasons why “Jim Crow laws” are still being enforced in the courts of Chicago, Illinois Negroe blacks and certain Hispanic judges as Democrats keep their mouths shut and go along with racial injustice.

  FEDERAL JUDGE GETTLEMAN: stated, Tuesday March 10, 2009, where he found Superintendent of police Jody Weiss in Contempt of Court and Ordered the City to Pay $100,000.00, “No one is above the Law”, he cited a 1928 decision by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, that said, “If the Government becomes the law breaker, it breeds Contempt for the Law, It invites everyman to become a law unto himself. It invites Anarchy.”            

The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Wednesday April 26, 2006, Page 1, Illinois Political Machines help breed corruption, Associated Press writer Deanna Bellandi states, “Illinois is apparently a Petri dish for corruption. It is a real breeding ground”.         

That Chicago is the most Corrupt City in America, Huffington Post, Internet Newspaper, February 23, 2012; University of Illinois Professor Dick Simpson, “The two worst crime zones in Illinois are the governor’s mansion…..and the City Council Chambers in Chicago.” Simpson a former Chicago Alderman told the AP “no other State can match us.”   

  

I affirm the above as being true.

                                                                                            Respectfully Submitted

                                                                                             Lee Oties Love, Jr.

                                                                                          Plaintiff-Counsel Pro Se

                                                          IN THE

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                         FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

                                            CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

                                                    Certificate of Service

  

I Lee Oties Love, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, certify that I have on this day deposited said Memorandum to all parties recorded in said Memorandum via regular mail/hand delivery.

                       U.S. Attorney

                       Joel R. Levin

                      219 South Dearborn Suite 500

                      Chicago, Ill 60605

        Cook County State’s Attorney            Chief Judge Timothy C. Evans

         Kim Foxx                                              50 West Washington, Suite 2600

         50 West Washington, Suite 500                Chicago, Ill. 60601

         Chicago, Ill. 60601                           

                                                                       

        Supreme Court of Illinois, 200 East Capital Ave. Springfield IL. 62701-1721;

   

      Pamela Elizabeth Loza 50 West Washington, Chicago, IL 60601, Room 3009;

      James P. Murphy 555 West Harrison, Chicago, IL. 60607, Room 402;

       Luciano Panici 16501 South Kedzie Parkway, Markham IL. 60428, Room 105;

       Joshua P. Haid Sears/Willis Tower 233 South Wacker, Chicago IL. 60606 84^th floor;   

                PLEASE BE ADVISED that on September 7, 2017, a Memorandum has been filed before the United States Court of Appeals.  

Dated September 7, 2017