AN INSIDE LOOK AT HOW JUDGES CRIMINALIZE INNOCENT MEN OF COLOR SEEKING CUSTODY AND VISITATION OF THEIR CHILDREN

I NEVER BEAT OR ENGAGED IN ANY DOMESTIC ABUSE OF MY CHILD OR NATASHA BUT SHE HAS BEEN ABLE TO LIE FALSIFY ANYTHING NECESSARY TO HELP CORRUPT RACIST JUDGES KEEP ME OPPRESSED AND FROM SEEING MY CHILD.

UNLIKE JOE LOUIS HE GETS LOCKED UP 5X'S FOR ALLEGEDLY OWING CHILD SUPPORT TO A WOMAN THAT DIDN'T HAVE HIS CHILD AND HE NEVER SEEN OR SPENT TIME WITH THE CHILD THAT IS NOT HIS IN THE HIGHTOWER V LAWRENCE MATTER.

CORRUPT JUDGES WHO HAPPENS TO BE RACIST TAKE GREAT PLEASURE DESTROYING FAMILIES OF COLOR, I HAVE DEPLETED ALL OF MY RESOURCES SOLD MY CARS LOST MY CONDOMINIUM JUST TO HAVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION.

HOW MANY OTHER MEN ARE GOING THROUGH THIS LEVEL OF INJUSTICE IN THIS CITY?

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT – DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

NATASHA BROOMFIELD )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 13 D 80423

)

LEE OTIES LOVE, JR. )

)

Respondent. )

MOTION TO VACATE AND/OR MODIFY PLENARY ORDER OF PROTECTION ENTERED ON DECEMBER 29, 2014

NOW COMES Respondent, LEE OTIES LOVE, JR. (“LEE”), by and through his attorneys, the Law Offices of Heather A. Widell, and pursuant to Sections 602, 603 and 607 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/602, 5/603, & 5/607), Sections 103, 224 and 226 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/103, 60/224 & 60/226), and Section 2-1301 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1301) requests that this Honorable Court vacate the plenary order of protection entered on December 29, 2014 or, in the alternative, modify said order to remove the minor child as a protected party and to allow parenting time and for other relief.  In support thereof, LEE states as follows:

COUNT I:  MOTION TO VACATE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter herein.

2. On July 14, 2014, this Court entered an Order following a pretrial conference awarding Petitioner “NATASHA BROOMFIELD (“NATASHA”) sole legal custody of the parties’ minor child, KAYLEE LOVE (“KAYLEE”); directing NATASHA to consult with LEE on parenting issues including, but not limited to, health, school, and extracurricular activities; and set out a visitation schedule for LEE with KAYLEE for the school year, summer and holidays. (See July 14, 2014 Agreed Order attached hereto as Exhibit A).

3. On December 29, 2014, the Court entered a Plenary Order of Protection (“Plenary Order”) against LEE in this cause finding NATASHA and KAYLEE to be protected persons.  (See December 29, 2014 Plenary Order of Protection attached hereto as Exhibit B).

4. The Plenary Order awarded NATASHA physical possession of KAYLEE and did not include any provisions for visitation between LEE and KAYLEE.  However, there is a reserved provision for supervised visitation between LEE and KAYLEE pending LEE’s completion of domestic violence counseling at the Center for Domestic Peace or through Metropolitan Family Services.

5. On January 15, 2015 LEE enrolled in The Salvation Army Family and Community Services Partner Abuse Intervention Program. (See January 15, 2015  Salvation Army Assessment attached hereto as Exhibit C).

6. On May 12, 2015 LEE enrolled in The Center for Advancing Domestic Peace Domestic Violence Assessment Program. (See May 12, 2015 Advancing Domestic Peace Assessment attached hereto as Exhibit D).

7. Additionally, LEE has taken courses at his church with his pastor.  

8. The Petition for an Order of Protection (“Petition”) filed by NATASHA is fraught with misrepresentations and ought to be vacated.  (See December 11, 2014 Petition for Order of Protection attached hereto as Exhibit E).  

9. Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act sets out the following definitions, in part, as follows:

(1)  “Abuse” means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.

* * *

(3)  “Domestic violence” means abuse as defined in paragraph (1).

* * *

(7)  “Harassment” means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner.  Unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the following types of conduct shall be presumed to cause emotional distress:

i.  creating a disturbance at petitioner’s place of employment or school;

ii.  repeatedly telephoning petitioner’s place of employment, home or residence;

iii.  repeatedly following petitioner about in a public place or places;

iv.  repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her home, school, place of employment, vehicle or other place occupied by petitioner or by peering in petitioner’s windows;

v.  improperly concealing a minor child from petitioner, repeatedly threatening to improperly remover a minor child of petitioner’s from the jurisdiction or from the physical care of petitioner, repeatedly threatening to conceal a minor child from petitioner, or making a single such threat following an actual or attempted improper removal or concealment, unless respondent was fleeing an incident or pattern of domestic violence; or

vi.  threatening physical force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions.

* * *

(9)  “Interference with personal liberty” means committing or threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she or he has a right to engage.  

(10)  “Intimidation of a dependent” means subjecting a person who is dependent because of age, health or disability to participation in or the witnessing of physical force against another or physical confinement or restraint of another which constitutes physical abuse as defined in this Act, regardless of whether the abused person is a family or household member.

* * *

(14)  “Physical abuse” included sexual abuse and means any of the following:

i.   knowing or reckless use of physical force, confinement or restraint;

ii.   knowing, repeated and unnecessary sleep deprivation; or

iii.  knowing or reckless conduct which creates an immediate risk of physical harm.

(15)  “Willful deprivation” means willfully denying a person who because of age, health or disability requires medication, medical care, shelter, accessible shelter or services, food, therapeutic device, or other physical assistance, and thereby exposing that person to the risk of physical, mental or emotional harm, except with  regard to medical care or treatment when the dependent person has expressed an intent to forgo such medical care or treatment.  This paragraph does not create any new affirmative duty to provide support to dependent persons.  

750 ILCS 60/103

10. The incident listed in the Petition, and upon which the Plenary Order was based, does not qualify under the definition of domestic violence as set out in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act.  

11. Additionally, LEE has never committed any offense or act towards NATASHA or KAYLEE which would justify a remedy under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act.  

12. LEE has a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in NATASHA’s Petition which are pleaded to restrict LEE’s access and visitation with the minor child.

13. That, on information and belief, the Petition was used for the improper purpose of gaining sole custody of the minor child and restricting LEE’s access to and visitation with the minor child.

14. Illinois courts have held that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act ought not to be used as a subterfuge to gain custody or an advantage in custody and visitation matters.  In re the Marriage of Gordon, 233 Ill.App.3d 617 (1st Dist. 1992).  

15. This Court has resources to determine the best interest of the child, if necessary, in the forms of children’s representatives, guardian ad litems, investigations, home studies and expert custody evaluators.  

16. The allegations made by NATASHA in her Petition are without reasonable cause, untrue, do not qualify under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, and, under information and belief, only made to obtain sole custody of the minor child and to restrict LEE’s access to and visitation with the minor child.  

17. LEE has been unable to see KAYLEE since the Plenary Order was entered.  

18. Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act states, in relevant part, as follows:

(7)  Visitation.  Determine the visitation rights, if any, of respondent in any case in which the court awards physical care or temporary legal custody of a minor child to petitioner.  The court shall restrict or deny respondent’s visitation with minor child if the court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following:  (i) abuse or endanger the minor child during visitation; (ii) use the visitation as an opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members; (iii) improperly conceal or detain the minor child, or (iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interests of the minor child.  The court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in Section 607.1 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.  If the court grants visitation, the order shall specify dates and times for the visitation to take place or other specific parameters or conditions that are appropriate.  No order for visitation shall refer merely to the term “reasonable visitation.”  

750 ILCS 60/214(7)(emphasis added)

19. There are no allegations in the Petition which indicated that KAYLEE should be a protected party as there are no allegations that LEE is likely to abuse, endanger, or improperly conceal the minor child.  

20. NATASHA does not allege any facts that indicate LEE’s visitation with KAYLEE should be restricted or denied; the Petition simply states that NATASHA “fear[s] for [her] and [her] daughter’s life.”  There are no incidents alleged in the Petition where NATASHA accuses LEE abused, endangered or improperly concealed KAYLEE.  

WHEREFORE, Respondent, LEE OTIES LOVE, JR. respectfully request that this Honorable Court:

A. Vacate the Emergency Order of Protection entered on xxx;

B. Order that the status quo of the parties’ sharing possession and control of the minor child be restored; and

C. For any other relief that this Court deems equitable and just in the premises.  

COUNT II:  MOTION TO MODIFY

21. LEE restates and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 20 of Count I above herein.

22. The Plenary Order does not contain a provision for visitation between Lee and the minor child.

23. There are no allegations contained in the Petition which indicate that LEE’s visitation with the minor child should be denied and/or restricted.

24. Under information and belief, the Petition was used for the improper uses of gaining sole custody of the minor child and restricting LEE’s access to and visitation with the minor child.

25. It is in the best interest of the minor child that she be allowed to have parenting time with her father.

WHEREFORE, Respondent, LEE OTIES LOVE, JR. respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

A. Vacate those portions of the Plenary Order of Protection entered on December 29, 2014 which designate the minor child as a protected party and deny LEE visitation;

B. In the alternative, modify the portions of the Emergency Order of Protection entered on December 29, 2014 which designate the minor child as a protected party and deny LEE visitation;

C. Order that the status quo of the parties’ sharing possession and control of the minor child be restored; and

D. For any other relief that this Court deems equitable and just in the premises.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________________

Attorney for Defendant

The Law Offices of Heather A. Widell

1507 E. 53rd Street, Suite 2W

Chicago, IL 60615

Ph: (773) 955-0400

Fax: (773) 955-1951

Atty. No.: #59374

ATTORNEY CERTIFICATION

I, NICHOLAS ECONOMAKOS, an attorney for the Respondent in the above-captioned matter, hereby certify that I have read the foregoing pleading, and after making reasonable inquiry, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, I find said pleading to be well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law, and not interposed for any improper purpose.  

_______________________________________

NICHOLAS ECONOMAKOS

VERIFICATION

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I, LEE LOVE, being first duly sworn and on oath depose and state that I am the Respondent in the above-captioned matter; that I have read the foregoing pleading and have knowledge of the contents thereof; and that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters I certify as aforesaid that I verily believe the same to be true.  

_______________________________________

LEE OTIES LOVE, JR.